This paper presents a two-country sticky-price model that allows for capital and investment spending. It analyzes the conditions for equilibrium determinacy under alternative interest-rate rules that react to either domestic or consumer price inflation. It is shown that in the presence of investment, real indeterminacy is considerably easier to obtain once trade openness is permitted. Consequently we argue that sufficiently open economies should adopt a backward-looking rule and sufficiently closed economies should employ a current-looking rule, in order to minimize policy induced aggregate instability.
Introduction
There is a large body of research that has considered the real indeterminacy implications of designing interest-rate rules in sticky-price monetary models. 1 The general conclusion that emerges from the literature is that in order to rule out real indeterminacy the monetary authority should follow the Taylor principle (i.e. an active policy stance), that is, a policy that aggressively targets either expected inflation (e.g. Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida et al. (2000) ) or current inflation (e.g. Kerr and King (1996) ) by raising the nominal interest rate by proportionally more than the increase in inflation.
However a number of recent studies have challenged the appropriateness of the Taylor principle in preventing multiplicity of equilibrium once the economic environment allows for capital and investment spending. Dupor (2001) introduces investment spending using a continuous-time framework and shows that a passive policy stance is required for equilibrium determinacy. In a discrete-time framework, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) show that with the addition of capital and investment spending equilibrium "determinacy is essentially impossible" under a forward-looking interest-rate rule. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of investment spending for equilibrium determinacy for economies that are open to international trade in goods and assets. Using a discrete-time, money-in-the-utility function framework, this paper develops a two-country, sticky-price model that allows for capital and investment spending. 4 The conditions for real equilibrium determinacy are analyzed for forward, current and backward-looking versions of the interest rate rule. In addition, two alternative price 1 By real indeterminacy we simply mean that there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths, starting from the same initial conditions, which converge to the steady state. 2 Interestingly, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2007) show that the range of determinacy can be significantly increased if the monetary authority implements an interest rate policy that responds to both expected inflation and current output. 3 Sveen and Weinke (2005) show that the range of indeterminacy is higher if firm-specific capital is assumed, relative to the more common assumption of a competitive rental market for capital. Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) show that the range of parameter values that guarantee local determinacy do not necessarily guarantee global determinacy. 4 To facilitate comparison with the existing literature, this paper adopts the traditional convention that end-of-period money balances enter the utility function. Assuming an alternative timing-assumption would have important consequences for equilibrium determinacy, as discussed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) , Kurozumi (2006) and McKnight (2007) .
indexes, which can be chosen as the policy indicator, are considered: domestic price inflation and consumer price inflation. By allowing for trade openness, it is shown that the indeterminacy problem is more severe under a forward-looking interest-rate rule and gets increasingly worse as the degree of openness increases. This result is robust for both possible indexes of inflation that can enter the feedback rule. However, unlike closedeconomy models, this indeterminacy problem can no longer be dramatically reduced by adopting an active current-looking rule. For both indexes of inflation, indeterminacy is induced provided the degree of trade openness is sufficiently high.
The intuition behind these results rests with how the degree of trade openness exacerbates the cost-channel of monetary policy which arises in sticky-price models with Consequently if the degree of trade openness is sufficiently large then this cost channel strictly dominates the demand channel and inflation expectations become self-fulfilling.
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature that focuses on the real indeterminacy implications of designing interest-rate rules in the presence of trade openness. A general conclusion arising from the existing literature is that the degree of trade openness is only important for aggregate stability if monetary policy responds to expected future consumer price inflation. Reacting to expected future domestic price inflation or implementing a current-looking rule guarantees equilibrium determinacy if the Taylor principle is adhered to. 5 Our analysis suggests that with the addition of capital and investment spending, the degree of trade openness increases the prominence of aggregate instability with the violation of the Taylor principle. This is robust not only to the index of inflation targeted, but also to the timing of the interest-rate rule employed. The failure of the Tay- lor principle for open-economies therefore suggests that monetary authorities face much greater challenges in the design of interest-rate rules. Specifically, in a sense to be made precise below, we argue that in order to minimize aggregate instability sufficiently open economies should react to backward-looking consumer price inflation, whereas sufficiently closed-economies should target current-looking consumer price inflation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the twocountry model. Section 3 examines the conditions for real equilibrium determinacy when current-looking interest-rate rules are employed. Section 4 considers the implications of alternative interest rate rules that react to forward-looking or backward-looking inflation.
Finally Section 5 concludes. 
The Model
where the demand for individual goods is given by
Furthermore, since the final good producer is competitive it sets its price equal to marginal cost
5 where P is the consumer price index and P H and P F are the respective price indices of home and foreign intermediate goods, all denominated in home currency:
We assume that there are no costs to trade between the two countries and the law of one price holds, which implies that
where e is the nominal exchange rate. Letting Q = eP * P denote the real exchange rate, under the law of one price, the CPI index (4) and its foreign equivalent imply:
and hence the purchasing power parity condition is satisfied only in the absence of any bias between home and foreign intermediate goods (i.e. a = 0.5). The relative price T , the terms of trade, is defined as T ≡ eP * F PH .
Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate firms hire labor and rent capital to produce output given a (real) wage rate w t and capital rental cost rr t . A firm of type i has a production technology:
where K and L represent capital and labor usage respectively, and the input share is 0 < α < 1. Given competitive prices of labor and capital, cost-minimization yields:
6 where mc t ≡ MCt PH,t is real marginal cost. Firms set prices according to Calvo (1983) , where in each period there is a constant probability 1 − ϕ that a firm will be randomly selected to adjust its price, which is drawn independently of past history. A domestic firm i, faced with changing its price at time t, has to choose p H,t (i) to maximize its expected discounted value of profits, taking as given the indexes P , P H , P F , Z and Z * :
where
and the firm's discount factor is β
Firms that are given the opportunity to change their price, at a particular time, all behave in an identical manner. The first-order condition to the firm's maximization problem yields
The optimal price set by a domestic home firm P H,t is a mark-up λ λ−1 over a weighted average of future nominal marginal costs, where the weight q t,t+s is given by
Since all prices have the same probability of being changed, with a large number of firms, the evolution of the price sub-indexes is given by
since the law of large numbers implies that 1−ϕ is also the proportion of firms that adjust their price each period.
Representative Agent
The representative agent chooses consumption C, domestic real money balances M/P , and leisure 1 − L, to maximize utility:
where the discount factor is 0 < β < 1, subject to the period budget constraint
The agent carries nominal transfer Υ t from the monetary authority. The agent then uses these resources to purchase the final good, dividing purchases between consumption C t and investment I t .
The purchase of an investment good forms next period's capital according to the law of motion
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital.
For analytical simplicity we assume that the period utility function is separable among its three arguments and the labor supply elasticity is infinite. 8 The first-order conditions from the home agent's maximization problem yield:
where R t denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond defined as R (16) is the consumption Euler equation for the holdings of domestic bonds and the money demand equation is given by (19) . Equations (17) and (18) are the respective labor supply and optimal investment conditions. Optimizing behavior implies that the budget constraint (14) holds with equality in each period and the appropriate transversality condition is satisfied. Analogous conditions apply to the foreign agent.
From the first-order conditions for the home and foreign agent, the following risksharing conditions can be derived:
where the constant q 0 = Q 0
. Equation (20) is the standard uncovered interest rate parity condition and equation (21) is the risk sharing condition associated with complete asset markets, which equates the real exchange rate Q with the marginal utilities of consumption.
Monetary Authority
The monetary authority can adjust the nominal interest rate in response to changes in domestic price inflation π h t+v or to changes in consumer price inflation π t+v , according to the rules: 
Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Market clearing for the home goods market requires
Total home demand must equal the supply of the final good,
and the labor, capital, money and bond markets all clear:
, and M t0−1 , M * t0−1 , a rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences
F,t } for all t ≥ t 0 characterized by: (i) the optimality conditions of the representative agent, (16) to (19) , and the capital accumulation equation (15); (ii) the intermediate firms' first-order conditions (8) and (9), price-setting rules, (11) and (12), and the aggregate version of the production function (7); (iii) the final good producer's optimality conditions, (2), and (14) is satisfied and the transversality conditions hold; (vi) the monetary policy rule is satisfied, (22) or (23); along with the foreign counterparts for (i)-(vi) and conditions (5), (6) , (20) and (21).
Local Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to analyze the equilibrium dynamics of the model, a first-order Taylor approximation is taken around a steady state to replace the non-linear equilibrium system with an approximation which is linear. 9 We employ the Aoki (1981) decomposition which decomposes the two-country model into two decoupled dynamic systems: the aggregate system that captures the properties of the closed world economy 10 and the difference system that portrays the open-economy dimension. Consequently for the equilibrium to be determinate it must be the case that there is a unique solution both for cross-country differences and world aggregates. The complete linearized system of equations is summarized in Table 9 To be precise the model is linearized around a symmetric steady state in which prices in the two countries are equal and constant (P H = P F = P = P * = P * H = P * F ). Then by definition inflation is zero (π = π * = 1), and the steady state terms of trade and nominal and real exchange rates are T = e = Q = 1. 10 The choice of which index of inflation each monetary authority targets is irrelevant for the aggregate system. This follows since world aggregate inflation (π W ) is given by 
Resource constraint
Taylor rule
World Aggregates
Marginal cost
Taylor rule
Notes: The index R refers to the difference between home and foreign variables e.g. + 1 − δ where the steady state levels are given by
Equilibrium Determinacy
We start by examining the conditions for equilibrium determinacy when monetary policy is characterized by a current-looking rule. First note that for a labor-only version of this open economy model, in which production is linear in labor (α = 0), under a currentlooking rule the Taylor principle (µ > 1) prevents the emergence of real indeterminacy for both the aggregate and difference systems.
12 As this section shows the conditions for reduces to the relative PPP condition for consumer price inflation i.e. π R t = ∆ et. 12 For example, as shown by McKnight (2007) , the Taylor principle is both a necessary and sufficient condition for local determinacy of the aggregate system and the difference system when domestic inflation is targeted. If CPI inflation is targeted then the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for determinacy 12 determinacy alter substantially with the inclusion of capital.
Aggregate System
The set of linearized equations for the world aggregates, given in Table 1 , can be reduced to the following four-dimensional system:
Since the dynamics of mc, x, and π are independent of the capital stock dynamics, one eigenvalue of the system is 1 + 
where 
Difference System

Domestic Price Inflation
If domestic price inflation is the policy indicator, then the set of linearized conditions for cross-country differences yields a system of the form:
and
. As before, the capital stock dynamics can be decoupled from the rest of the system. However, the eigenvalue associated with the capital stock dynamics now depends on the degree of trade openness. Consequently this eigenvalue can be either inside or outside the unit circle depending on the value of a. The Appendix proves the following:
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Proposition 2 Suppose that monetary policy reacts to current-looking domestic price inflation. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1), the necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy of the difference system are:
(Case I) a > 0.5 and either
and (ii)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Cases I and II of Proposition 2 show the regions of determinacy when the root associated with the capital stock dynamics is unstable, whereas Case III shows the regions of determinacy when this root is stable. We illustrate these determinacy conditions using Indeed comparing (29) with condition (27) of Proposition 1 yields Case III is relevant for any a < 0.4716 15 and condition (ii) of (32) is always satisfied.
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Thus from condition (i) of (32) first-order indeterminacy can arise provided the inflation coefficient µ is sufficiently low. It is straightforward to show that this lower bound on µ is decreasing with respect to a:
and thus as the degree of trade openness is reduced, the higher the inflation coefficient that is required to prevent indeterminacy.
Consumer Price Inflation
If consumer price inflation is the policy indicator, then the set of linearized conditions for cross-country differences yields the five-dimensional system of the form: 15 Note that this threshold level for a is independent of the degree of price stickiness (ψ). Furthermore it is remarkably robust to variations in α and λ. For example setting λ = 4 requires a < 0.467 whereas setting α = 0.25 requires a < 0.459. 16 Given the benchmark values for β and δ, condition (ii) of (32) is always satisfied for any a ≤ 0.47 provided α > 0.295.
. Now there are two predetermined variables K (Case I) a > 0.5 and at least one of (33) and (34) is satisfied;
, and
and at least one of (33) and (34) is satisfied;
and (36)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 highlight important qualitative differences between reacting to consumer and domestic price inflation. First, the range of second-order indeterminacy is relatively lower if consumer price inflation is targeted. This follows from direct comparison of conditions (29) and (33):
Secondly, the range of first-order indeterminacy is relatively greater under consumer price inflation targeting. By comparing the Case III conditions of Propositions 2 and 3, it is straightforward to show that (36) is a stronger requirement for determinacy than condition (i) of (32). 17 Furthermore by comparing condition (ii) of (32) 
Discussion
In the absence of capital the Taylor principle holds under a current-looking rule regardless of whether the economy is open or closed. However as shown in the previous section, 17 This follows since Λ 1 > In an open economy the CPI inflation rate depends on both the domestic inflation rate and the terms of trade:
where T t−1 is predetermined. An increase in the real interest rate not only reduces do- 
The Timing of Interest-rate Rules
So far the analysis has focused on interest-rate rules that target contemporaneous inflation. In this section we consider interest-rate rules that react to either forward-looking or backward-looking inflation.
Forward-looking rules
We start by examining the conditions for equilibrium determinacy under forward-looking inflation rules. The aggregate and difference systems are both four-dimensional generating a zero eigenvalue in each case. Since capital is the only predetermined variable, equilibrium determinacy requires the remaining three eigenvalues to lie outside the unit circle. This automatically suggests that for determinacy of the difference system, the root associated with the capital stock dynamics must be unstable, which in turn implies that determinacy is impossible for sufficiently open economies.
Aggregate System
Under a forward-looking rule, the set of linearized equations for the world aggregates, given in Table 1 , yields a system of the form:
One eigenvalue of the system is given by 1 + C K > 1, while another eigenvalue is zero.
Consequently, equilibrium determinacy requires that the two remaining eigenvalues of B Proposition 4 Suppose that monetary policy is characterized by a forward-looking interest rate rule. Then a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy of the aggregate system is
Difference System
The set of linearized conditions for cross-country differences yields a system of the form: 18 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) present a necessary condition for determinacy, whereas Proposition 4 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy.
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under domestic inflation targeting; whereas
. Analogous to the aggregate system, one eigenvalue of the system is zero. Therefore determinacy requires the eigenvalue 1 + 
; (40)
Proposition 6 Suppose that monetary policy reacts to forward-looking consumer price inflation. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1), the necessary and sufficient con-ditions for determinacy of the difference system are (Case I) a > 0.5 and 1 < µ < min Γ
pressure on inflation, the effect of which is stronger the higher the degree of trade openness (a ↓).
Backward-looking rules
We now turn our attention to backward-looking interest-rate rules. The determinacy analysis proceeds as before except now the aggregate system is five-dimensional and determinacy requires two eigenvalues to lie inside the unit circle and the remaining three eigenvalues be outside the unit circle. The difference system is six-dimensional under consumer price inflation targeting and determinacy therefore requires that there are exactly three eigenvalues inside the unit circle and three eigenvalues outside the unit circle. As before the capital dynamics eigenvalue can lie inside or outside the unit circle depending on the size of a. Since responding to backward inflation makes the analytical conditions for determinacy more complex to derive, we will simply report some numerical results. 
First suppose the eigenvalue e K is unstable, |e K | > 1, which requires either a > 0.5 or 0.5 > a > 
and either 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
If monetary policy targets current-looking consumer price inflation then one eigenvalue of the coefficient matrix A R CP I is given by e K ≡ 1 + 
and either This completes the proof.
